

THE
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AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BELIEF.

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An interesting case in the psychology of belief has recently come to my notice, which I give here in the words of the subject of the experience.

"When I was young I went through the usual process of conversion, and found much comfort in my communion with God. My faith in God's love was shaken after a year by some trying personal experiences, and when their bitterness had passed away my reason would not allow me to believe again in the church dogmas. For a period of six or eight years I was hostile to the church, and then, as I became accustomed to my unbelief and found others who thought with me, my feeling died down and my attitude became one of genuine indifference. By degrees I came to believe that what men call God is the impersonal first cause of the universe, and that prayer has no value whatever as prayer, since there is no God who hears.

"This state of mind lasted for about fifteen years, during which I went through various experiences of sickness and loss of friends without feeling in the least the need of belief in a personal God. It culminated in a physical breakdown and a moral crisis in which I first lived a life of deception, and then by reason of some tendency still utterly inexplicable to me, found myself obliged to fight and conquer the temptation. It is impossible to state too strongly my feeling of being the creature of an outside force both in the yielding and the conquering. It seems as if my own consciousness were literally only a spectator, while some deeper race or instinctive self held the stage.

"Following this came a period of several years, when my health improved steadily, but I seemed to be nearly at a standstill intellectually and morally, save that I constantly became more sensitive as to my relations to other people. Then one day I found myself holding

as the very center of my life an ideal which suddenly appeared to be monstrous, to be filled with tendencies to wrong action. I realized that I was in truth little better than when I had yielded, since I lived in thought the same life of deception and continued to set before myself an ideal unattainable by any honorable means. I saw clearly enough that I should have to give up that ideal or become openly bad, and while I shrank with horror from the sin that lay open to me on one side, I shrank almost equally from the nothingness awaiting me if I uprooted the ideal. What then could serve as the center for my thoughts to cluster about? When attention relaxed, upon what could my worried mind sink? Where could my pent-up emotions, my starved instincts, find their satisfaction? What a shrivelled, repressed nonentity my personality would become!

"The days went on and the struggle became more desperate as my purposeless and hopeless life grew more monotonous. I tried to adopt the ideal of social service, but service alone is drudgery to one who lacks other ideals. Two factors especially contributed to my despair. The first was the feeling of my own insignificance or uselessness in the world of people, and the second was the paralysis of much of my emotional and intellectual self which followed upon the removal of my old ideal. My thoughts and feelings were constantly turning towards and groping for this loved and customary object. When they did close upon it, shame and remorse followed; but when they found only nothingness, the sense of being baffled, of stepping off into the darkness, was indescribably painful.

"During this time, my attention was called to the possibility of a new sort of belief in God. I felt that if I had belief in a personal God, it would serve as the focus for my thoughts, and would also remove the feeling of my worthlessness, but it seemed to me utterly futile to attempt to demonstrate the objective existence of such a God. No philosophy had ever proved more than the existence of a first cause, and science was emphasizing at every point that this cause was impersonal. Then on what possible ground could one reasonably assume a personal God?

"Both Kant and modern psychology justify one in assuming as true a theory which is essential to the best living. The burden of proof comes to show that it is actually essential. If living demands the assumption of a personal God, then it is reasonable to make that assumption; but does it demand it? Here I remained for some time. I questioned whether I could not in time conquer this desire as I had others, but I found myself standing on the brink of the abyss again and

again, and I became so harassed and at last so afraid that I was forced to admit that I could see no way of relief unless there were a something to help me.

"But then came the question of whether I could use the concept of a personal God without belief in its objective existence. Could I try it as a mere working hypothesis and expect to get any valuable results? Anyhow, I saw nothing else to do, so I said to myself that it does not matter in the least whether God exists outside of the minds of men. If one can get strength and comfort from talking to God as if he exists, it makes no practical difference even if the sense of his love and help is an illusion created by one's own mind like all the visions of the martyrs and saints. Such illusions remake the world at any rate. On the other hand, if God really does exist, one can best reach him by prayer and thought of him. It seems almost ludicrously self-evident that in either case one will not lose practically though one may be wrong theoretically.

"Therefore I deliberately set to work to reacquire the sense of God's presence which I had not had for nearly twenty years. I reinforced my reason by reiterating my reasons for assuming such a personality, and I prayed constantly after the fashion of the old sceptic: 'O God, if there is a God, save my soul if I have a soul.'

"Then one night after a week of this sort of thing, the old sense of God's presence came upon me with overpowering fulness. I can not express the sense of personal intimacy, understanding and sympathy that it gave to me. I felt the thing—whatever it was—so close to me, so a part of me, that words and even thoughts were unnecessary, that my part was only to sink back into this personality—if such it were—and drop all worries and temptations, all the straining and striving that had been so prominent in my life for years and years. Then, as I felt consolation and strength pouring in upon me, there came a great upwelling of love and gratitude toward their source, even though I was all the time conscious that that source might not be either personal or objective. It *felt* personal, I said to myself, and no harm would be done by acting as if it were so.

"This experience lasted for two days in nearly its original strength. Every time that attention relaxed from my tasks, the presence was there, and it was the last at night and the first in the morning in my consciousness. Gradually it became less vivid, but at times it still recurs with its original force.

"On the practical side its value up to now—after a period of three months—has been permanent. I find my thoughts falling back upon

the idea of this presence as soon as I get into any sort of trouble or perplexity, and the invariable effect is to calm me and to enable me to take a wider outlook. I am so curiously conscious of it as a person that I find myself checking certain thoughts and acts just as I would check words if some one else were here, and I break out into conversation with it in the same incidental fashion as I do with a friend who happens to sit in the room where I am working.

"So far as the theoretical question is concerned, I cannot say that I am any nearer a solution than before, nor do I see any possibility of a solution. But I am daily demonstrating that the assumption of God as a reality is of use to me, and I care less and less whether he exists outside of my own consciousness or not. If he is indeed a mental creation alone, I only marvel the more at the power of the human mind, and still find the idea one of the most valuable in living."

The writer of this account seems to have had an experience of a truly mystical character. The curious thing about it is that she can admit the possibility of the presence being wholly subjective and yet apparently get the same emotional warmth and practical efficacy as if she were sure that it was objective. It will be interesting to see whether she maintains this balance, or once more loses the sense of the Presence, or else becomes convinced of its objectivity.

PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION.

Education in Religion and Morals. G. A. COE. Chicago, Fleming H. Revell Company, 1904. Pp. 434.

Professor Coe attempts in this book to apply the teachings of modern psychology and pedagogy to the problem of religious education. The task is a large one and the correlation of the material involved is far from being a simple undertaking. It is with a vivid realization of the difficulties inherent in the problem itself that the following review and criticism of the work is offered.

The author shows, in the first place, that religious education should be considered as an organic part of general education, and that its object, specifically, may be said to be either the development of the religious nature, the transmission of the religious heritage of the race, or the adjustment of the race to its divine environment.

It is pointed out that the notion of the total depravity of childhood is unchristian; that the view of the child as a plastic, unformed being needing development is the true Christian view and one that is as well in accord with modern pedagogy. There then follows a suggestive discussion of the most vital points of modern educational theory. This is used as a basis for the theory of religious education which follows. The chief points taken up are: education as a universal necessity; its method that of development; its present foundation upon a truer theory of child nature; its growing concreteness, the increasing breadth of its scope, and its social character. With all of these principles religion is in essential agreement, and hence an education in religion should provoke no conflict between religious thought and the results of modern educational theory. The truth of this position is especially illustrated by play, recognized to-day as of such genuine educational value, and shown to be of equal importance in religious education. The older view that religion must be absolutely divorced from all that is sportive is sharply criticised. Too often have children been taught 'to think of their most free and spontaneous activities, their plays, as having no affinity for religion, and then we wonder why religion does not seem more attractive to them as they grow toward maturity' (p. 144). Hence, "If the thought of God or of Christ kills the joy of

games and plays, that merely proves that we have misinterpreted the divine to children."

While the importance of play as an educative factor in religion is fully admitted, we may perhaps question what seems to be the author's particular point of view. He seems in some passages to make the point that religious ideas may properly be quite constant elements in plays and sports. Thus he says that Christ should be made master of the playground. Let him not be conceived as 'a mere don't.' "He is come that children may have their own life and that they may have it abundantly. That means play with its fun, its noise, its contests. The more of Christ there is in play, the more fun there is, etc." (p. 148). Perhaps the author does not mean that religion shall be made such a *conscious* factor as these words seem to imply. In fact he says later that the normal way for children to advance in the law of love is to live out their selves in association with one another. All the contingencies of ordinary social child life have their place in this development. "To make Christ master of the playground, then, means such wise and subtle supervision of play as helps childhood impulses gradually to interpret themselves through their own expression into the Christian philosophy of life" (p. 150).

He rightly holds that religious education is more than the imparting to the child of symbols of religious realities, it is rather the growing up in the midst of these realities and the unconscious absorption of them, through life in a properly organized social community (p. 168). These social relationships with all their possibilities of fellowship, imitation, and suggestion are of prime importance in the development of the religious nature. A boy is loyal to country and family without knowing especially how he has become so. So virtue and all the higher religious ideas are learned. Religious education is thus not necessarily something 'dragged in' by sermonizing, if it is a natural growth in an environment organized on and exemplifying Christian principles (pp. 186, 190). The habits thus acquired furnish the basis of later conscious judgments of reflective morality and of religion generally.

The more strictly psychological aspects of the problem are discussed in the section of the book entitled 'The Child.' The author seeks here to make a 'detailed study of that within the child which religious education is called upon to develop, namely, the religious impulse.' The section contains a brief sketch of the psychology of childhood and an attempt to trace the development through childhood

and youth of this impulse, which is, he holds, 'native to the human mind' (p. 197). It is defined as that which leads 'toward the progressive unification of the man with himself, his fellows, nature, and all that is' (p. 201). It involves a realization of dependence and limitation, a projective element, or an element of aspiration which in time produces an ideal self and an ideal world which are spontaneously taken as the truly real.

It seems to the present writer that Professor Coe in his conception of the religious impulse is open to somewhat severe criticism. In the first place he posits a native religious impulse as a psychological fact and then seeks to give what is apparently a metaphysical account of the origin and development of this impulse. In the second place the whole discussion belongs rather to the philosophy of religion and is out of place in a book on religious education.

With reference to the theory of the religious impulse, he holds that in the infant consciousness there gradually develop the notions of self and of world as correlative ideas. Out of this relationship grows by degrees the conception of an ideal world, coördinate, of course, with the child's experience, and this eventually matures into a definite religious impulse. As a specific illustration, "The incompleteness of the parents' response to the questioning impulse permits the child mind to pass on toward the ideal of a being who can answer all questions" (p. 223). In other passages, however, the conception of the development of the religious impulse is less involved in semi-metaphysics and becomes somewhat psychological in form. Thus, "The very first impressions that the child gets of his world, his first glimmering sense of self, his earliest sense of need, all these begin to form his view of the world and his attitude toward life" (p. 206); and, "It is civilization that makes children civilized; it is the existing religion that makes children grow in religion" (p. 210). The author's position is evidently that each individual is originally endowed with a religious impulse, which owes its development, however, to the influences of the social group within which that individual finds himself (p. 211).

It is certainly not clear from the author's exposition, which is here only imperfectly represented, wherein there is ground that warrants the hypothesis of a religious impulse. If its development is to be explained in terms of the reaction of the psycho-physical organism upon the natural and social environment, why may not its *origin* be thus accounted for also? Will it be any less religious if it be found to be a construct from simpler elements? If, in other words, we say with the author, 'that which is natural comes first and then that which is

spiritual' (p. 206), we can see no necessity for going back to an elemental something that is religious. This seems the less necessary in the light of a further statement of Professor Coe's, that 'the religious principle is at work in all that goes to make up human experience.' If the whole process of development and growth is really one in which the divine seeks expression in the human, then human experience in all its phases is raw material for the construction of a religious attitude and the really vital question is as to what might be called the *mechanics* of the process of its construction.

The discussion of the parallelism of the religion of the child with that of the race is hardly more satisfactory. He recognizes that the theory of recapitulation in religion is quite limited in its application. In fact, to make the statement, "How far the child shall go in the process of recapitulation depends chiefly upon the kind of environment in which he is placed" (p. 214), is to admit that for all practical purposes the notion of 'the push from behind' is a myth. One strongly wishes that he had stuck consistently to these excellent statements in his treatment of childhood religion: "From the start, little by little, children assimilate the highest elements of their environment." "But the truth is that, if forcing and pressure be avoided, a child who is in contact with mature life develops with perfect naturalness while constantly absorbing elements of the higher culture;" excellent statement, we say, but only provided the implication of 'higher culture,' etc. is simply that the child is immature in the midst of a complicated social environment and that while he consequently often does quite crude things he rapidly adjusts himself, as a matter of fact, to the demands of the social whole in which he lives. His crudeness is solely the result of his immaturity and not of his savage ancestry, and he gets rid of it with astonishing rapidity if he chances to be in an environment of culture.

But the theory of recapitulation, though discredited, is not abandoned, but becomes an important means of throwing mysterious sidelights upon many simple facts of childhood and youth. Thus the hypothesis that primitive religion was animistic, non-ethical, and directed toward natural objects or ghosts (all of which points may be seriously questioned on the basis of recent anthropological science), is applied to the child's religion. Is it really true, as the author suggests (p. 218), that 'children are at first animists,' or that 'they interpret all nature by means of what they feel in themselves'? The illustrations adduced do not seem very clearly relevant. As is later admitted, many of these crude conceptions of children can be traced to the defective teaching they have received.

The last two chapters of this section, 'The Child,' devoted to the periods of development from infancy to maturity, are very satisfactory. The author here ceases to make any attempt to show traces of recapitulation and discusses in an entirely illuminating way the changing interests of childhood and youth with their significance for religious culture.

Part III. deals with religious education from the side of institutions, namely, the family, Sunday school, societies and clubs, academies and colleges. The treatment is both practical and suggestive and deserves separate notice. The book closes with two chapters on the perspective of religious education and a useful bibliography.

In a brief review it is out of the question to give any adequate account of the variety of topics treated by Professor Coe in his book, or the very great value and suggestiveness of the work as a whole. If one may be permitted, however, to pass on unsupported criticism, he might say that the usefulness of the book for those for whom it is written would have been greater if a less wide range of topics had been covered and if the material presented were better organized with reference to the main theme.

Religious Revivals and their Ethical Significance. J. G. JAMES.
Internat. Jour. of Ethics, 1906, XVI., 332-340.

The religious revival, interesting from many points of view, is of peculiar interest to the student of ethics. To what extent, by its appeal to the deeper psychic processes and by its tendency to bring large numbers of people into contact with some leader of commanding personality, does the revival become a positive factor in moral progress? At first thought it will seem, from the very nature of its appeal, that the revival must of necessity result in moral betterment. But it must not be forgotten that certain negative influences are set up through the large number who inevitably backslide, persons who thus become all but impervious, in the future, to all appeals toward better living. Still, it might be with justice maintained that it is of advantage that the moral ideal be at times impressed upon people, though it be imperfectly and with seemingly transient effects. The rise of moral and religious fervor in the revival and its apparent lapse afterward may indicate simply a necessary pulsation in morality as there is in all things that move. Is this a normal condition of moral progress or should it not tend to be steady and continuous? This question cannot be answered without taking into account the almost invariable connection of some great leader with times of moral progress. The fact of this connection

lends plausibility to the hypothesis that moral evolution is best measured by the advances scored by successive leaders. But however important the leaders may be, it is worthy of note that their appearance is usually preceded by a period of unusual stagnation in morals. This tends to make the outburst, when it comes, feverish and unhealthful. Realizing these facts, the moral leader should on the one hand endeavor to secure as much natural growth as possible, and, on the other, recognize that waves of moral fervor attain their greatest value if accompanied or preceded by a certain amount of healthful growth.

The great moral leader is to be regarded not as a product of forces existing before and in his time, but rather as an unexplainable variation, a sport, if we please, in the moral world as there are sports in the biological world. He is to be considered not strictly as a result of wider social movements, but rather as a coördinate factor along with general social processes in the movement toward higher levels of morality. He may even be more than this. The personal equation may be of the greatest importance in all ethical movements, the highest category in morals and in moral progress.

It appears, then, that while the revival may be productive of many psychical excesses, and while it may tend to place an undue stress upon the occasional upheaval and not enough upon continuity of growth, it really is a factor in moral progress in that it utilizes a rhythm which in some degree or other is inevitable and is an avenue through which a person of superior moral insight may impress himself upon the masses.

The Psychology of Sudden Conversion. MORTON PRINCE. Jour. of Abnormal Psychol., 1906, I., 42-54.

The author criticizes Professor William James' view that sudden conversions are to be accounted for by a somewhat extended period of incubation of motives in the subconscious region. The theory may account for some cases, but it is certainly not true generally. Granted that sudden conversion is a normal phenomenon, 'it has not yet been demonstrated that in *normal* life there is any active subconscious field sufficiently large to develop the ideas which have been noted.' Moreover, the theory has not been demonstrated by experiment and even James admits that there are cases in which the subconscious incubation seems quite unlikely.

The author then presents a case (reported more fully in *The Dissociation of a Personality*), which closely resembles the Ratisbonne case discussed by Professor James. In each case the individual, after a period of extreme depression, experienced a sudden illumination or

state of ecstasy. The change in Dr. Prince's patient was not of a religious nature but was in every other way identical with this type of religious conversion. She was found in a high state of mental exhilaration. After a period of great depression all had changed without her knowing how or why. There was a gap in her knowledge between the end of the depressed state and the beginning of the exalted state. This gap was filled by the accounts given by two or more secondary systems excited by hypnosis. It was thus brought out that while she 'was communing with herself, her eyes became fixed upon one of the shining brass lamps of the church,' whereupon she went into a trance-like state in which her consciousness was made up of many disconnected memories, each of which was accompanied by emotion. These emotions were in general of well-being, peacefulness, or exaltation. When she awoke the memories of the trance state were forgotten but the emotions persisted. "They were of lightness of body, of physical restfulness, and well-being, besides those of exaltation, joyousness, and peace, largely of a religious nature." When she regained her logical ideas, which were of a religious nature, the emotions present were associated with them although they had originated in connection with quite a different thought setting, now of course forgotten. This led her to regard her sudden change in condition as due to a miraculous visitation. "In this case, then, there was no incubation or flowering of subconscious ideas deposited by the experiences of life through a period of time; there were simply emotions of the moment which had developed in a trance state, which persisted after coming out of the crisis as a state of exaltation, and which, of themselves, through their naturally associated ideas, suggested the beliefs which took possession of her mind. These emotions were reënforced by those belonging to a series of subconscious ideas which were a sort of subconscious continuation of the trance dreams."

In general, Dr. Prince believes that in most cases of sudden conversion, "at this crucial moment the subject, perhaps half oblivious of his surroundings, sees visions which are apt to be the expression of his doubts, and hears a voice which speaks his own thoughts. On coming out of this hysteroid, or hypnoid, state, the exalting emotions persist, along with an incomplete or possibly complete memory of all that has taken place. These emotions then give an entirely new shape and trend to the individual ideas, just as the distressing emotions following hysterical accidents determine the form of the mental content."

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BELIEF.

The Relation between the Act and the Object of Belief. WALTER B. PITKIN. J. of Philos., Psychol. & Sci. Methods, 1906, III., 505-511.

By way of introduction the writer calls attention to the fact that the word 'belief' has two possible meanings, 'the thing believed in' and the belief attitude. Consequently the question of the reality of beliefs may take three forms: (1) Is the object exactly as we believe it to be? (2) Is the belief attitude real? (3) Is there any real connection between believing and the object of belief? The last problem is the one considered.

It is said that nitrous oxide can induce the belief attitude, while belief is ordinarily supposed to be based on reflection. Can these apparently opposed positions be harmonized? The problem is this, Does not the act of belief always give us assurance of something? Belief as a mere 'useful occupation' does not satisfy the metaphysician. "It is only by showing that the act of believing either expresses or implies something about reality that we can come to trust the act itself." The belief-act, therefore, contains a transcendent element, implying a certain independence of the act and the object of belief. This is true in a temporal sense. I believe to-day that a certain event took place yesterday. For the metaphysician every belief-object has a reality. The existence of hallucinations does not militate against this position, since the belief objects in this case exist, though ordinarily misinterpreted. This is not saying that the belief-object exists apart from one's consciousness-system as a whole. The question of truth is that of a proper distinction between reals. Chronic hallucinations, where the object represented does not entirely disappear in spite of disbelief in its external reality, prove the independence of the belief-object.

Consequently, whether the belief attitude be induced by nitrous oxide or by convincing logic, in neither case are we compelled to admit that the objects believed in depend for their existence on the activity of believing.

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FEELING AND EMOTION.

Organic Changes and Feeling. JOHN F. SHEPARD. Am. Jour. of Psy., 1906, XVII., 522-584.

The chief concern of this paper is an examination of certain forms of possible organic reactions accompanying various mental processes,

with special reference to Wundt's tridimensional theory. Some slight essay is made, besides, to determine the character and nature of P-UP, E-D, S-R in accordance, it would seem, with the conception of feeling as unanalyzed sensation.

After a concise review of the literature up to date the experiments follow thus :

I. *Peripheral Volume Changes*: The instruments used were a plethysmograph, with a delicate piston recorder, described by Lombard and Pillsbury in the *American Journal of Physiology*, Vol. VIII., and a Sumner pneumograph.

Six trained introspectionists were tested with a wide range of stimuli (sounds, odors, problems, etc.) and in every case asked to classify their mental reactions in terms of S-R, E-D and P-UP. From these the paper quotes extensively.

II. *Volume of the Brain and of the Periphery*: A laborer of average intelligence, who had had a piece of the skull 8×6 cm. removed on the right side near the Rolandic region, served as subject. Here, too, introspections were recorded and many stimuli were used.

III. *The Rate of the Heart and Breathing*: Dr. Shepard's method of counting the pulse deserves consideration. He measured each pulse beat of a given wave in terms of a $\frac{1}{100}$ second unit and plotted them in a curve. His curves reveal frequent shorter temporary reactions whose character could not have been seen by a rougher method. They show, too, that the larger general changes are uncertain if studied less accurately. "There are large variations from purely physiological causes . . . and the kind of results one seems to get by any method of averages [such as counting the number of pulses in each 10 seconds] depends far too much on where in one of these curves one begins his count."

The results are based on an interpretation of 150 curves from Experiment I., 150 from Experiment II., and 110 from Experiment III. No curve was used whose corresponding introspection could not be classified as P or UP, S or R, E or D. How many records were rejected in Experiments II. and III. is not stated. Three hundred were held to be unsatisfactory in I., not only because of poor introspection, but often because *there was no reaction*. This absence of reaction was not due to temporary insensitivity or discrepancies in the apparatus. Is it not, therefore, sufficiently interesting to demand an enumeration of the instances of it, at least? Were there, for example, 150 curves in Experiment I. with good introspections, but no appreciable organic reaction?

Dr. Shepard's interpretation of the introspective results of I., II., and III. seems to point to a theory in part like that of Wundt. On the basis of vasomotor and heart-rate changes, on the other hand, he is convinced that neither a dual nor a tri-dimensional classification is possible. He attempts no correlation of these two.

Introspection evidences that P-UP, E-D, S-R exist, P-UP only, however, are unanalyzable and felt to be opposites. "S-R, E-D when analysed *lose their character as feeling* and are resolved into organic, particularly muscular, sensations." Thus analysed there is no sharp line of demarcation between S and E. Strain seems to be a teleological whole in which every element connects with all the others. "Excitement, on the other hand, is characterized by a half fusion of the different lines of association." Moreover, R is hardly the opposite of S or E as P is of UP. It is rather a secondary state due to the returning from the sensations one gets from the active muscles of S or E, to those of the lax muscles, in release from S or E, and partakes of them both. So, the consciousness of R differs according as it follows S or E and contains the afterglow, now of one, and again of the other. Nor is depression-rest the opposite of S or E; it is simply different. "It obtains its sensory content from the quiet muscles or those acting easily, . . . we can have it simultaneously with neither S nor E, except when felt as oppression, and continued S as well as continued E gives rise to D."

Between the physiological accompaniments of P-UP, S-R, E-D there is no reverse relation, not even between P-UP: much less are there three such pairs of reactions. "In short, all moderate nervous activity tends to constrict the peripheral vessels and to increase the size of pulse in the brain. All moderate nervous activity likewise increases the heart rate. Strong stimuli cause both an exciting and inhibiting effect, which is seen especially in the heart rate. They also cause a double reaction in the brain. The most marked effects are at the changing periods, particularly with an incoming stimulus. Lastly, the activity of any part, or the prominence of sensations from it tends to counteract constriction in that part" (p. 558).

The paper, as a whole, is admirable. It closes with a suggestion or two in explanation of the reactions obtained.

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Wundt's Doctrine of Psychical Analysis and the Psychical Elements, and Some Recent Criticism. I. *The Criteria of the Elements and Attributes*; II. *Feeling and Feeling Analysis.* EDMUND H. HOLLANDS. Am. Journ. of Psych., XVI., 499-518; XVII., 206-226.

The general motive for these papers is to be found in certain criticisms of Wundt's doctrine of feeling expressed in two recent articles by Dr. Washburn. These, according to H., are as follows: (1) It is not clear whether Wundt's criterion of analysis, independent *variability*, includes independent *existence*. If it does, feelings are not elements; if it does not, what would justify his refusal to make attributes themselves elements? (2) His criterion for the attributes, independence of the mental context, is insufficient to rule out clearness as an attribute. (3) His distinction between feelings as subjective and sensations as objective is epistemological and extra-psychological. (4) His reference of the unity of feeling to that of apperception, and his consequent definition of the simple feeling, make it impossible to distinguish between simple and complex feelings, save by reference to their sensational substrate. H. proposes "by an examination of the various passages bearing directly upon the subject in all of Wundt's published writings, to determine his present theory of analysis and the psychical elements, and the various changes through which it has passed; . . . in the second place, and by aid of the clearer light which may thus be thrown upon the matter, . . . attempt to decide whether, and how far, Dr. Washburn's criticisms are justified."

In tracing the evolution of these problems, H. succeeds in defining four periods: I. Characterized by the fact that feeling is not yet treated as an element (1862-83). II. Characterized as studies of method (1883-89). III. Characterized by the treatment of feeling as an independent element, but with two directions only: pleasantness — unpleasantness (1889-96). IV. Characterized by the culmination of Wundt's doctrine of feeling in the feeling manifold (1896-1902).

Considering Dr. Washburn's points of criticism in the light of H.'s exegesis, we find that (1) is met even in the writings of the first period which treat the element as being marked off by its *separability*. As to independent existence, the second edition of the *Logik*, which falls in the third period, makes it a criterion for sensation but not for feeling. Feelings, it is true, are not independent in the same way that sensations are, but it is a dogmatic prejudice which declares that all subjectively unanalysable constituents of consciousness must be possible isolated objects of attention. As to the distinction between elements and attri-

butes, the element, while no breach can be made in it, can be experienced in different mental contexts. Attributes cannot be so separated and experienced.

(2) The attributes have four criteria, instead of one merely, as mentioned by Dr. Washburn. These, too, appear in writings of the first period, and are as follows: (a) The element is structurally distinguished by the attributes quality and intensity. (b) Every sensation has these, and they are inseparable from it and from each other. (c) These attributes attach to the element itself, and do not depend upon its relation to the context of which it forms a part. (d) As distinguished from each other, however, they are independently variable and can therefore be attended to separately. Clearness as an attribute, it will be noted, is ruled out by criteria (b) and (c).

(3) In the *Beiträge zur Theorie der Sinneswahrnehmung* (1862) and in the *Vorlesungen über die Menschen- und Thierseele* (1863), pure sensation is considered to be the original element, while a distinction, partly epistemological, is made between feeling and sensation in the stricter sense. The perceptual process is conceived as a series of unconscious judgments or inferences, as a result of which subjective and objective moments in the pure sensation are distinguished as feelings and sensations respectively. This epistemological distinction is expressly given up in the first edition of the *Grundzüge* (1874), also in the first period. The distinction of subjective and objective as two phases of conscious experience is, however, retained throughout Wundt's writings, although it is not until the fourth period that we find a strictly psychological meaning for it. This we do in the first edition of the *Grundriss der Psychologie* (1896). Here sensations and feelings are differentiated in accordance with three specific criteria: (a) The qualities of sensation move between maximal differences, whereas those of feeling move between maximal opposites. (b) Simple feelings are declared to be much more numerous and various than simple sensations, and are considered as subjective complements, not only of sensations, but also of ideas and ideational complexes. (c) Sensations fall into disparate systems, while feelings form one connected manifold. Here in (c) the origin of the subjective nature of feelings is explained psychologically as consisting in this unity, this connectedness in a single continuum.

(4) In writings of the third period, first in the *Logik*, second edition (1895), we note that, although the criteria of separability and non-decomposability are maintained as fundamental for determining an element, still the method of analysis for feelings differs from that

employed in analyzing sensations. Feelings may be analyzed by considering the sensational substrate as the feeling stimulus, and varying it experimentally to test the relative simplicity or complexity of the feeling thereto attached. However, we learn from writings of the four periods, in particular the successive editions of the *Grundriss*, that mere reference to the sensational substrate is not sufficient to determine the character of the feeling. It may happen that independent variation in the components of a sensation, as, for instance, brightness, saturation, color tone, might alter the feeling and thus make it appear complex.

The author has carried out his investigation in a painstaking and, it would appear, accurate manner. It does seem, however, that in a work of this character, a clearer and more comprehensive tabulation of results might have been formulated for the purpose not only of lightening the reader's efforts, but also of making the work more readily accessible in matters of reference.

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Abhängigkeit der Atem- und Pulsveränderung vom Reiz und vom Gefühl. M. KELCHNER. Arch. f. ges. Psychol., V., 1-124.

This is one of the most interesting of the recent articles on organic reactions. Its especial value is in the careful study of the breathing changes. Curves were recorded from both chest and abdomen. As in nearly all investigations of the kind, the method of determining the heart rate is not sufficiently accurate.

The writer gives a thorough criticism of Lehmann's work and passes to the experiments on agreeable and disagreeable states caused by taste, visual, and auditory stimuli. Agreeable tastes were accompanied by a quickened pulse, agreeable tones and colors by a slowed pulse. The quickening of the pulse with taste stimuli varied inversely with the agreeableness of the experience, so that longer pulse seemed to be here the natural expression of agreeableness. The pulse increased in rate generally with disagreeable states.

The breathing changes in both agreeable and disagreeable showed great individual differences. Pulse and breathing are, to a certain extent, independent variables, and there is a great difference in the significance of the two as expressions of the feelings. The individual differences are found in depth and rate changes as well as in the relative part of the chest and abdominal factors, so that it is always necessary to consider both breathing curves.

Strain was studied mainly by announcing a reaction of some sort which should take place at a second signal. Quickening of the pulse was the result. The breathing showed great individual differences. Relaxation gave the reverse of the expression of strain, and this was true even in the individual differences. If strain preceded and turned to relaxation at an agreeable or a disagreeable process, the relaxation simply displaced the other feeling reactions, and the result was indifferent to the nature or degree of the agreeableness or disagreeableness.

Cutaneous pain gave rather uneven results. There was a tendency toward faster breathing. The pulse was quickened except with one subject. A faster pulse and an irregular, generally somewhat quickened breathing accompanied fright. There was a slowing of the pulse afterward. This seems to correspond to the feeling of relaxation which may follow fear.

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La Haine. Étude psychologique. E. TARDIEU. Rev. philos., LX., 624-635. December, 1905.

L'Ironie. Étude psychologique. GEORGES PALANTE. Ibid., LXI., 147-163. February, 1906.

Les conditions biologiques du Remords. G. DUMAS. Ibid., LXII., 337-358. October, 1906.

In the psychology of the affective life the study of particular emotions and emotionally qualified dispositions in detail seems to be the order of the day. The three articles here noticed are among a relatively large number of the sort that have recently appeared and, if not typical, may nevertheless serve to suggest the kind. The first two are mainly descriptive, the third physiological; all end in a judgment of value. Each in its way is characteristically modern, but the descriptive articles, at any rate, cannot on that account claim superiority over older models.

Hate, according to M. Tardieu, is an expression of the instinct of self-preservation in persons excessively emotional and egoistic. Some hatreds are transitory and disinterested, but many are congenital. The temperamental hater hates everything. Various conditions of hate are pointed out and various forms and occasions of its manifestation. Finally, as to its value, it is said that while it is not to be recommended, yet it is at times a stimulus to talent (writing, eloquence), and, since one can't love everybody, hatred of foreigners is an excellent preparation for the future when self-preservation will oblige us, in the interest of pride and victory, to strike a blow at our enemies!

The conception of irony has passed through various changes since Aristophanes (*Nub.*, 229) first used 'ironical man' to denote a clever, foxy character, like Socrates. In Plato, too, 'irony' and 'ironical' are used only in a bad sense. Aristotle defined the 'ironical man' as one who depreciates himself by disclaiming or underestimating his real worth, as, for instance, Socrates (*Eth. Nic.*, IV., 7). This finer meaning was lost sight of, however, by Theophrastus, who pictures the ironical man as 'one who takes a cynical pleasure in misleading or inconveniencing others by the concealment of his real feelings and intentions' (Jebb). In modern times irony is loosely applied as a synonym of sarcasm to a mode of speech that conveys an idea the opposite of that which is literally expressed. M. Palante, without defining it, treats it as essentially an attitude of thought and sentiment. His views are as follows: The general psychological conditions of irony are a dualism of thought and intuition, of thought and action, of intelligence and sensibility, or, again, a conflict of instincts in sensibility itself. Its metaphysical principle is pessimism, which in its social aspect is nihilism. It differs from cynicism in that the cynic takes himself at least seriously, whereas the ironical man takes himself no more seriously than the rest. Yet irony may have in it an element of tragic seriousness. Philosophically, it is the direct opposite of rationalism, which looks to the ultimate triumph of reason in the world, and differs from the attitude of criticism, which is a variety of rationalism. There are various kinds of irony — intellectual and emotional, spontaneous and reflective. There is also a kind of irony which is not irony proper, but cynicism, irony as a method of life. In conclusion the author expresses the opinion that irony has to-day a useful function in preserving open-mindedness as against social and moral dogmatism.

M. Palante's study interestingly describes certain recognizable moods and attitudes that may perhaps be called irony, but it appears to allow no place to playful irony nor to the characteristic irony of Socrates, who, one would suppose, must after all furnish the point of departure for any discussion of the subject, and who was certainly no pessimist.

M. Dumas seeks to show by pathological evidence that the feeling of remorse depends not only on logical conditions, such as a comparison of conduct with ideas of good and bad, but also, and more particularly, on affective and physiological conditions. Six cases are used in illustration and four of them treated in detail. In a case of 'passive' melancholia it required considerable effort to rouse any real

feeling of remorse at all; the hypodermic injection of a gram of caffeine modified the severity with which the patient judged her conduct; in her state of exuberation—she belonged to the 'circular' type—she excused and justified it. In two cases of 'active' melancholia the symptoms of mental and physical depression were combined with manifestations of acute suffering, but the remorse was suppressed in both cases by the application of stimulants. In a case of morbid scruple the most efficacious means of combatting the feeling were found to be such physical appliances as a bath, exercise and the injection of caffeine. The principal conditions of remorse in pathological cases are, in the author's opinion, first, a state of depression with the instincts and desires that caused the fault in abeyance, and second, either (*a*) a feeling of distress evoking painful memories, or (*b*) a disturbed feeling of diminished vitality causing the subject to dwell on fixed ideas which define and accentuate the emotional distress. In both cases the remorse is an expression of the disturbing, unresigned depression. The conditions in 'normal' persons are similar; in fact, persons who suffer remorse are never quite normal, but tend either to pathological scrupulosity or to anxious melancholy. The author illustrates this by two examples. Nor are such persons peculiarly moral. On the contrary, the healthy moral attitude is not remorse, but repentance and reparation.

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Crying. ALVIN BORGQUIST. *Am. J. of Psychol.*, 1906, XVII., 149-206.

The author bases his study upon the replies to 200 questionnaires sent out by President Hall. He divides the subject into three parts: (1) The more general aspects of crying, physical causes, influence of age, and description of mental states. (2) An analysis of the act of crying as a series of physical events, such as attitudes of body, sobs, lump in the throat. (3) A general review of the present theories of crying.

As shown by the questionnaire, crying appears to be a reaction from many apparently different states, such as anger, grief and joy, which may be taken as the most general divisions. These three divisions also prove to be widespread and, so far as can be determined from the data furnished, universal among all races.

Age seems to produce diverse effects upon crying. The cry of the child is sharp and usually expresses a bodily need or desire. He cries more from anger or pain, while the cry of the adult is from grief.

The child's cry is one of helplessness; that of the adult one of hopelessness.

Crying is the crisis of a period of strained effort. Energy is at a low stage, activity is stagnant. The will gives up and the interruption relieves the strained condition.

Having dealt with the reasons why we cry, the author considers the question of why we cry just as we do. Crying, both as observed by those who answered the questionnaire and viewed as a physiological process, is a very complex phenomenon. It is difficult to define or explain, yet it presents itself in a more or less uniform series of acts with decided changes due to age or other conditions.

The essential elements of crying are: changes in the circulation, lump in the throat, vocalization, sobs and tears. The attitude of the body also differs with the cause of the cry; the typical attitude of the grief cry is one of collapse. Vocalization in the cry is found among the first acts. It is found more among primitive people than among civilized. In the cry of hunger, fear or anger the cry is clearly a call for help, and it is in fulfilling its function as such that language has, in part at least, developed. The lump in the throat is a mysterious element. It seems to precede the tears and to come close to the sobs.

Generally the sob comes later in the cry and remains after other symptoms are suppressed. It is usually a part of adult grief, and is generally looked upon as a climax of the crying spell. Except in a few instances tears are absent during the first weeks of life. It is this element of the cry that is least under the control of the will. Tears are essentially a part of the grief cry, and not of the cries of anger, fear or hunger of the child.

Both in medical opinion and in the opinion of many other observers, crying comes as a mental relief principally, for the physical effect is one of exhaustion. It occurs under many different mental and physical conditions, but its principal element seems to be a shading from a feeling of helplessness in the child to a feeling of hopelessness and surrender of the will in the adult. Crying, in the last analysis, is a situation in which a reaction has taken place after a period of strained effort and depleted energy. Analyzed into its various physiological parts, the crying act presents two groups of symptoms: (1) the active movements of calls, as represented in the vocalization of the infant, and (2) the facial expressions, the sob, the lump and tears, all of which are connected closely with the vagus and other cranial nerves, and also very closely connected with the digestive apparatus and are thus interpreted as rejection movements, going back to the primitive form of rejecting food.

To quote directly from the author, these movements are, according to this interpretation, a primitive form of expression on the physical side of the mental state of displeasure. The mental and physical acts having never been dissociated from each other, the suggestion is made that, in more subdued form, some such actions occur as the correlate of all states of displeasure. The particular form of expression of helplessness by the cry has been preserved, together with its subjective correlate, pity, as a fundamental psycho-social situation.

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L'explication physiologique de l'émotion. G. R. D'ALLONNES. J. de Psychol. Norm. et Pathol., 1906, III., 14-25, 132-157.

This article consists of a description of some experiments of Bechterew and Sherrington which bear upon the theory of emotions, and their interpretation upon the basis of the visceral theory of the author. Bechterew removed the cortex of dogs and cats, and found that, as long as the optic thalami remained intact, the animals were capable of all the movements expressive of an emotion. Bad treatment produced such manifestations of anger as grinding the teeth, bristling of the hair, and the erection of the ears, while caresses produced wagging of the tail and, in the case of the cat, purring. Previous experiments by Charles Bell and Stromeyer had already shown that, when the cortex is intact and the optic thalami removed, such reactions are impossible. The experiments of Bechterew show, therefore, that in the absence of intelligence and subjective affectivity the physiological and mimical manifestations continue to be produced by external and internal excitations.

The experiments of Sherrington were made upon five young dogs after section of the spinal cord in the inferior cervical region and, in two of the animals, of the vagosympathetics of both sides. Thus, while the connection between the spinal cord and the sympathetic system was uninjured, all connection between the brain and the thoracic and abdominal viscera was destroyed, as well as that between the bulbar vaso-motor center and all the blood vessels, except a few supplied by the cranial nerves. The skin and motor organs, including the muscles of the shoulder, were likewise deprived of all communication with the brain. The head, the diaphragm, and the front part of the anterior members (*i. e.*, the principal organs of expression) are the only parts which remained sensitive. But, in spite of the exclusion of nearly the totality of the body, the reactions from this uninjured territory — play of the physiognomy, diaphragmatic voice, movements

(still possible) by the flexors of the neck — continued to be produced as if the subjective emotion existed. Sherrington concludes that the subjective emotions were actually present.

This conclusion of Sherrington is incompatible with the conclusions drawn by M. d'Allonnes from a patient suffering with loss of the emotions, which loss was apparently due to a complete visceral anaesthesia. One may ask, therefore, says M. d'Allonnes, if the dogs of Sherrington do not merely place us in presence of the mimical reactions, coördinated but unemotional, which Bechterew has studied, with this complication, however, that the brain, deprived of the afferent data without which the emotion is not produced (sensations from the viscera), continues nevertheless to influence the mimical mechanism. The unemotional patient of M. d'Allonnes showed all the outward signs of an emotion at the very moment that she complained of feeling no emotion. He claims that, similarly, it is probable that the dogs of Sherrington no longer felt an affective shock, properly so called, but that their habits, their mental images, and their perceptions continued to produce a conduct intelligently, but mechanically, adapted to circumstances, in the absence of affective sentiments.

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The Feeling of Unreality. FREDERICK H. PACKARD. J. of Abnorm. Psychol., 1906, I., 69-82.

The writer follows Wernicke in the three-fold classification of 'the feeling of unreality' based on the relation of consciousness to the outer world, to one's body, and to one's mental self. Various theories in regard to the disorder are noted. The evidence at command seems to show that this feeling is not due to disorders of the cutaneous, muscular, or visceral sensations.

The patient whose case is discussed in this article suffered from several attacks of depression, the last of which was marked by a strong feeling of unreality. Some of her expressions were: 'Things about are like dreams'; 'I see the trees and yet I don't see them; they don't seem real and yet I know that they must be because they are the trees that I always saw'; 'It is as if I were dumb, I can't sense things.' The special senses and memory were unimpaired, and the sense of pain only at times diminished. Experiments proved that the apperceptive activities were complete but carried on with considerable difficulty. Easy stories acquired meaning only through a laborious process of visualizing the objects referred to.

The writer's hypothesis is that 'the feeling of unreality is due to a disorder of apperception, which in turn is due to an association difficulty.'

Since the same depression and retarded associations were present in other patients without the feeling of unreality, is it not probable that the feeling of unfamiliarity present in this case may have been the cause of the feeling of unreality? 'I remember with my head but not with my feelings,' would indicate that the process of association was complete, but that the feeling of familiarity ordinarily attending the recall of previous impressions was lacking.

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ATTENTION AND INTEREST.

Physiologie et psychologie de l'attention. JEAN PAUL NAYRAC.

Préface de TH. RIBOT. Paris, F. Alcan, 1906. Pp. xi+212.

The author defines attention, together with effort and will, for these states or activities are indistinguishable one from another, as our 'faculty of mental adaptation.' All other mental, and all organic functions are in coöperation with it. He devotes sixty pages to a review of the physiological phenomena that are peculiar to states of attention. Acceleration of heart beat and respiration in brief attention, plethysmographic determinations, cerebral vaso-dilation and peripheral constriction, chemical combustion and hyperglobulæ, physical fatigue after attention, nerve tonics and their effects, the oscillations of attention, which this state or activity presupposes—these are some of the topics which are reviewed. The author in many cases reports the conflicting results and opinions of experimenters. Thus he creates the impression that his review is thorough and makes this section of his volume of great value to the physiological psychologist. From this review he draws the conclusion that attention is of central origin; that peripheral phenomena are parallel to it but are in no sense conditioned by it, nor, on the other hand, do the latter produce attention. It is a general condition of nervous activity from the physiological viewpoint. Pathology confirms all this, for mental dissolution is reflected throughout the organism in the systematic disappearance of those peripheral phenomena which are observed in states of attention. The physiological evidence suggests the fundamentally instinctive nature of attention.

The order of mental dissolution — and hence of degeneration of attention, since all mental powers are wrapped up in it — is from complex to simple. The low-grade idiot and the mystic in ecstasy, both

at the bottom of the scale, are alike incapable of attention, properly speaking. The simplest, most ancestral instincts are still strong. They resist pathological processes for a long time.

This gives the cue to the reëducation of attention, a subject to which the author devotes several pages. He has made no contribution to present knowledge of the matter. The general rule — 'from simple to complex' — is applied by all those who undertake the reëducation of the aphasic or any other type of paralytic.

In the education of attention in the first instance let the motor factor be prominent. A knowledge of manual work, and especially of the language of deaf mutes, should be required because they afford such a varied motor expression of mental activity. A thought, expressed motorially, is not readily forgotten. M. Biervliet, in his *Education de la mémoire*, has shown that the motor is the most precise form of memory.

In both school and home, which are the social factors in the education of attention, the conditions should be as nearly as possible like those of actual life. The over-indulgent teacher and parent are a hindrance to the realization of this ideal. Under them the child does not develop and thoroughly fix increasingly complex habitual reactions and the habit of prolonged voluntary attention, even to disagreeable problems, for the sake of a remote advantage. But it is only by fixing these complex reactions which are uppermost in the mental hierarchy that a strong barrier, difficult of penetration, if not impassable, can be erected against that dissolution of attention, and hence of the whole mental fabric, which usually accompanies disease and old age.

What the author says of the education of attention suggests, though he does not discuss, the proposition that the doctrine of interest, faultless as it is when perfectly understood and applied, is, by many at least, sadly abused. Many young teachers and teachers-to-be, after reading some of our popular pedagogical literature for normal schools, infer that such and such topics should be taught, and according to a particular method, because these are the topics 'that are interesting to children,' and this is the 'way that makes them more interesting.' The teacher descends into 'soft pedagogics,' and many a one remains there. Far from making her institution a 'school of life' she makes it one of smooth indulgence. Time is wasted in a foolish attempt to make necessarily uninteresting subjects interesting. The pupil's effort is reduced to a minimum and his increasingly complex reactions, therefore, are not firmly fixed into habits. Perseverance under disagreeable circumstances becomes a foreign virtue.

Would it not be wise for the teachers to take for their motto: "More learning and less teaching!" Surround the lesson with enough interest to release the pupil's effort and let it be as severe as he can safely endure. Thus the best in the doctrine of interest is observed and the work habit in our pupils is well-nigh assured.

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The Relation of Feeling and Interest. LUCINDA PEARL BOGGS.
Jour. of Phil., Psych. and Sci. Meth., 1906, VIII., 462-466.

Before treating of the relation between feeling and interest, Miss Boggs proceeds to find exactly what are the characteristics of feeling as distinguished from emotion and cognition. Emotions are more complex phenomena, consisting of 'organic sensations, idea complexes and the simple affective elements which are sometimes called affection, simple feeling or feeling tone' (p. 462). Feeling on the other hand is irreducible. It leads to the expressions, 'I feel I ought to do this, I feel it a pleasure, I feel it a real concern, etc.' (p. 462). As regards cognition, there is a more definite external localization, a certain objective reference present which is lacking in feeling.

In feeling there are present vague, subjective, incommunicable states. When interest is present, these vague states become objective, definite, communicable to others than ourselves. Interest thus is an in-between state tending to bring about an alternation of vague feeling states and distinct cognitive states. Feeling and interest are not identical. "A feeling may develop into an interest, since the idea which is to lead in the quest for a chain of reasoning and its conclusion may arise from the vague sort of consciousness above described" (p. 465).

Following Wundt's theory of feeling we may pair the following:

Involuntary attention.....	Pleasantness.
Vacuity or distraction	Unpleasantness.
Interest	Excitation.
Indifference.....	Repose.
Voluntary attention.....	Strain.
Inattention	Relaxation.

Interest is without the organic changes present in emotion, and seems to be closely connected with a feeling of excitement.

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PERSONALITY.

The Personal and the Individual. ARTHUR ERNEST DAVIES.
Journ. of Philos., Psychol. and Sci. Methods, 1906, III., 401-409.
Mr. Davies makes a distinction between these terms, person and

individual, that seems sufficiently clear and fundamental to remove the further consideration of the difference between them from the realm of 'esthetic annoyance' to that of 'intellectual problems.' The distinction lies in the field that Mr. Davies calls 'social psychology.'

In a social group we find both structure (*i. e.*, organization expressed in a constitution) and life (*i. e.*, the development of the conscious life of its members considered collectively). The term personal is more closely related to the former, the conservative, mechanical and statistical aspect of the group; for, "to be a person means that the larger life, the common shared life of the group, comes to a particular expression in each of its members in such a way that the originality of the expression does not subvert, but conserves, the fundamental and primary meaning of the constitution which confers the rights and sets the limits of personal activity. Personality, we see, then, is a distinctly social quality."

Individuality, on the other hand, is related rather to the development, the life of the group, for it 'consists in those unique qualities, or unique combination, of common qualities, by which one man is distinguished from another in the same social group.' 'The subject as individual is reacting . . . so as to emphasize differences, not . . . to maintain similarities. But the differences . . . fall within the group, which . . . conditions from start to finish the life that human beings are necessitated to live.' In this sense we speak of 'strong individuality.' Personality is typical, and social. Individuality is atypical, but the variation and tendency to separate from the group is really essential to the life of the group. Individuality therefore involves personality and is the more highly developed character. Both individuality and personality illustrate, 'although with a different emphasis,' the same general fact that the members of the group must express the group type each in a different way.

Mr. Davies, after reminding us that personality of itself would constantly tend to the habituation of actions and thus to unconsciousness, points out that from such a result the escape lies either in moving from one group to another, the course of the weak individual, — or in awakening to the *ideal* which every social group implies, the course in which individuality is shown. This part of the argument is incomplete in that it does not show how this power to see the ideal is related to mere variation, in which the essence of individuality is said to consist.

Discussion of imitation, while not essential to the argument, is important, for it is largely in accord with Baldwin's theory of 'circular

reaction,' and puts in a rather striking way what seem to be some implications of that theory. We never imitate anyone but ourselves, says Mr. Davies, for to imitate is to reproduce a state or condition of one's own feeling life; the causation of imitation lies in the life of feeling. From this it would seem that unconscious imitation is a misuse of terms, and that infectious laughing or yawning, where the stimulus is so different from the subject's sense of his own response, is not imitation. Again, Mr. Davies says that imitation functions primarily for the enjoyment of the act, and while it operates for the sake of the adjustments mediated by it, yet that is a secondary consideration. This statement leaves it doubtful whether 'the causation of imitation' which 'lies in the life of feeling' lies in the feeling of the action to be reproduced, or in the feeling that the action will indeed be a reproduction. The former on the whole seems to be Mr. Davies' position, and it leads, as I understand it, to an identification of imitation with volition, *i. e.*, with any realization in movement of an idea of that movement!

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Ethics, Sociology, and Personality. J. A. LEIGHTON. *Philosophical Review*, 1906, XV., 494-510.

A most interesting presentation of ethical standpoint is given by Professor Leighton in this article. His cry for a study of actual conditions reminds one of Herbert Spencer's demand for actual practice on week-day of our Sunday theory.

"We must start," says Professor Leighton, "from our own ethical experience, however confused and inconsistent it may seem, and whatever course of investigation we may pursue, its final term must be our own reinterpreted and clarified judgments" (p. 495). Confusion exists in modern ethical judgment because of the attempt to judge new situations from traditional standpoints. Properly to study ethical values, historical orientation becomes necessary. "The great bulk of generally recognized ethical judgments and commonly accepted maxims of conduct has a social reference and their history is interwoven with the history of society" (p. 496). This historical reference shows the evolutionary character of many of our ethical interpretations. Sociology affords us a method of approach, but we must go still further in the study of ethics. The individual becomes an originating center of judgment and action, "and for ethics the reflective individual, capable of independent insight, . . . should be the center of primary consideration and ultimate reference. . . . It is a sociological problem as to how institutional morality is evolved and maintained. It is, *par*

excellence, an ethical problem as to how in a changing or relatively stable social structure, as the case may be, the individual may realize and express *personal values*" (p. 499).

From this standpoint, Professor Leighton shows clearly the three distinct levels of moral activity in the history of the race and of the individual. "First is the purely reflex or unconscious social or tribal morality of unreflecting selves who are simply passive organs of the 'tribal self.'" Tradition and custom here rule. "The second principal level of morality is that in which the individual consciously and reflectively identifies his own interests and standards of action with those of society. At this level the self becomes aware of the rationality of social or institutional morals" (p. 499). At the third or highest level the self becomes transcendent and places the sanction of action within himself. To use the words of Professor Leighton, we have a distinction 'between the social as *given* and as *ideal*, between the moral life as *gegeben* and as *aufgegeben*.'

By making the study of ethics swing round the rational self, one need not be entirely individualistic, however. We find within such individualism a certain social reference of average kind. "Not only do individuals possess a common reason, but, through their very individualities, they embody in diverse proportions and relations common tendencies of feeling and action. In matters of justice, truth telling, self-control, there is a general tendency common to civilized men" (p. 508).

Summarizing the close analysis of Professor Leighton, we might say: Ethics as a study revolves round a rational self whose personality as expressed in action meets a certain average social approval and at the same time transcends such social usage. "The ultimate centers of ethical judgment and action are persons, and since persons judge and act in accordance with rational principles, they must be members of a rational order. Ultimately the principles of ethical valuation express the actual relations of persons to the world-order" (p. 510).

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ETHICS.

Esquisse d'une morale positive. G. BELOT. Revue philosophique, 1906 LXI, 278-390.

M. Belot's exposition of his positivistic ethics proceeds from an antinomy. (1) A positive morality must derive all its principles exclusively from the motives and purposes of the individual. Its standard for universalizing the individual's actions must be derived

from his ultimate purpose in life. Ordinary naturalism and rationalism, and all systems founded upon authority and tradition, must be rejected because their sanctions are external. Kantianism also errs in seeking to impose one universal law upon all *agents*; morality should instead simply universalize the individual's *actions*, so as to make them mutually harmonious and efficient in achieving his ultimate purpose. Man is only responsible when confronted with himself and his destiny. "His ultimate *duty* can only be his most fundamental *wish*." (2) On the other hand, morality must be recognized as a *given*; we have neither imagined nor invented it. Since an *a priori* investigation of objective morality would be too vague and unreliable, we must instead examine this 'given' inductively. Accordingly, an empirical examination of our actual judgments indicates that we apply a moral judgment to an individual only in so far as his conduct is conceived as engaging the interest of other persons and, finally, of the social group to which he belongs. A review of historical and ethnological 'givens' indicates that every society always imposes moral rules upon the individual in its own interests.

The solution of the antinomy is found in the fact that social rules are imposed as a result of the endeavor of individuals to realize their ends. The 'fundamental wish' of the individual is 'to live in society'; and society—'the common and universal condition of all human aims and activities'—is the 'supreme end' of the individuals which constitute it, for the very reason that it is the 'universal means' for the accomplishment of every end. Society is then both fact and ideal, given and end. Of course our present social morality is imperfect, and we must recognize the right of individuals to criticize and reform it. However, life in society is ever the individual's ideal, and not only conditions, but also coördinates and organizes all his volitions.

Numerous practical advantages are claimed for this scheme of positive morality. Its appeal to the individual is direct, resting upon the single source of obligation which he can recognize—the opportunity to realize himself. As it is immediately demonstrable, without theological and scientific foundations, it is directly convincing, and particularly valuable for educational purposes. It is precise in its application; and, while it is flexible and progressive, it is also prudent and obligatory. It embraces humanity in all its aspects, not needing to distinguish the physical, economic, and professional man for separate treatment. It recognizes individuality (as versus Kantianism), and does not propose the *same* work for every man, but a *common* work. Organizing all the functions of the individual and shaping them for society, it is the most suitable morality for a democracy.

Some of M. Belot's criticisms of other schools will hardly elicit assent from those not already inclined toward positivism. For instance, his criticisms of Kant hardly do justice to the doctrines of autonomy and the kingdom of ends—conceptions extremely similar to those of M. Belot. However, M. Belot's outline develops his theses in logical order, and is not only extremely suggestive, but in the main convincing. His forthcoming work in the Alcan library will be awaited with interest.

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BOOKS RECEIVED FROM JANUARY 5 TO FEBRUARY 5, 1907.

- Die Vorstellungen der Tiere.* K. GRAEFER. Berlin, Reimer, 1906. Pp. 184. M. 3.
- Psychology.* Part I. *Elemental Consciousness.* W. B. LANE. Lynchburg, Va., Bell Co., 1906. Pp. 208.
- The Aesthetic Experience: its Meaning in a Functional Psychology.* ELIZ. K. ADAMS. Chicago, Chicago Univ. Press, 1907. Pp. 114.
- Practical Dietetics, with Reference to Diet in Disease.* A. F. PATTEE. Fourth Ed. Published by the author, Mount Vernon, New York, 1906. Pp. xvi + 312.
- Völkerpsychologie, eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von Sprache, Mythos und Sitte.* Bd. II. Mythos und Religion. Th. i and ii. Leipzig, Engelmann, 1905-6. Pp. xi + 617, and viii + 481. M. 14 and 11.
- Sex and Society, Studies in the Social Psychology of Sex.* W. I. THOMAS. University of Chicago Press, 1907. Pp. vii + 325.
- Congress of Arts and Science, Universal Exposition St. Louis, 1904.* Vol. VIII. Education, Religion. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin, 1907. Pp. x + 493. [Completes the series.]
- The Psychology of Religious Belief.* J. B. PRATT. New York and London, Macmillans, 1907. Pp. xii + 327.
- Report of State Board of Charities and Corrections of the State of California, 1906.* Sacramento, Supt. State Printing, 1906. Pp. 221.
- Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life.* W. R. BOYCE GIBSON. London, Black, 1906. Pp. viii + 168.

Morals in Evolution. A Study in Comparative Ethics. L. T. HOBHOUSE. Two parts in two volumes. New York, Holt, 1906. Pp. xvii + 375, and vii + 294.

Statistical Abstract of the World. H. GANNETT. New York, Wiley, 1907. Pp. viii + 84. [A useful summary of the latest census and other statistical results.]

NOTES AND NEWS.

THE announcement has been made that Professor William James has determined to retire from active teaching at Harvard University after this year. We extend to our honored colleague and long-time collaborator on this REVIEW our hearty congratulations on his extended and most distinguished service to his university and to the profession of teaching.

DR. CHARLES E. GARMAN, professor of moral philosophy and metaphysics in Amherst College, whose 'Commemoration Volume' was reviewed in the January BULLETIN, died on February 9 after a short illness. He was 57 years old and had been connected with Amherst since 1880.

WE also record with regret the death on January 10 of Dr. Walter Smith, professor of philosophy in Lake Forest University, and the death on January 24 of Dr. David Irons, professor of philosophy in Bryn Mawr College.

MR. HERBERT H. WOODROW, A.B. (Michigan), has been appointed demonstrator in the psychological laboratory at Princeton University.

THE Philosophical Union of the University of California has been carrying on for the past year a series of studies introductory to the philosophy of religion, the success of which, according to the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, has been such as to determine the Union to continue its work in the same field during the present year. Professor McTaggart's *Some Dogmas of Religion* has been selected as the basis of discussion.

OWING to the illness of the Secretary of the American Psychological Association, we have been compelled to defer publication of the Proceedings till our March number. The meeting of the American Philosophical Association will be reported in the same issue.

